It was the autumn of 1929 when business began to decline. Where Neil Smith's employer had needed six lorry drivers, now he needed only five.
But Smith, a young Englishman, was not worried. With his employer's cooperation, the six drivers formed a "pool" to share the remaining work.
His foreman arranged to have a different member of the pool "play off" (be temporarily laid off) for three days at a time. When his turn came around, Smith signed on at the Employment Exchange. Having been unemployed for two three-day periods over the last two months, he had already registered at the Exchange and so qualified immediately for unemployment benefit. The 13 shillings he and his young wife received for each three-day period were not much less than his wages while employed, and even permitted a visit to the cinema during his short "vacation."
It was the winter of 1935.
Michael Richards had been without steady work for nearly five years. Initially confident of his ability to find another job, after months of frustration he grew sullen and despondent.
At first, his 32 shillings a week in benefit had been enough, after rent and expenses, to put food on the table for his wife and three children.
But after exhausting his entitlement to unemployment insurance benefit,
Richards was forced to turn to the meagre 22 shillings of means-tested relief provided by the Public Assistance Committee. Potatoes and turnips replaced meat on the table, and even that was in short supply. Smith's children seemed small compared to their classmates. He himself blamed inadequate diet for the hacking cough which had caused many a foreman to turn him away. The search for work being futile, he spent most of the day on the street commiserating with his mates.
Messrs. Smith and Richards are fictional characters. there is the problem of accurately enumerating those in and out of work.
For interwar Britain, the generally accepted statistics on unemployment derive from the operation of the unemployment insurance system. The unemployment rate among the insured is shown in Figure 1 . Not all workers were covered by the system; most notably, agricultural workers, the i£ n ss n ee BE ie ee 62 BE is 9E SE w ES BEST
would not have had to contract. The problem, as they saw it, was that real wages (money wages deflated by product prices) rose dramatically after 1929 instead of falling (as shown in Figure 2 ). This resulted not from a rise in money wages but because prices collapsed and wages lagged in following them down. Some critics, like Pigou, blamed the unions for the slow adjustment of wages. Others emphasized the extent to which wages were governed by custom rather than current economic conditions. Still others, like John Maynard Keynes, in his General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money, argued that wage cuts would only aggravate the situation, since the problem was not that labor was too costly but that the demand for products was too low and reducing wages would further reduce consumption.
A second prominent feature of the unemployment series in There is no disputing that, from 1922, unemployment benefits for a family of four represented a substantial fraction of average adult male wages (see Table 1 ). But that fraction was also substantially less than one so that unemployment did lower incomes. The level of benefits alone cannot tell us much about the extent to which the dole encouraged unemployment.
Benjamin and Kochin's statistical analysis led them to conclude that over the period as a whole the operation of the unemployment insurance system raised unemployment by five to eight percentage points. unemployment traced out a U-shaped pattern, starting at high levels among young adults, declining to low levels among workers in their late 30s and early 40s, and then rising among older workers. The relatively young complained that employers discriminated against the inexperienced, while the elderly complained of "the wall of age" -that employers turned away older workers on the grounds that they had come to expect higher wages, that they might be more subject to illness, or that they might be disinclined to learn new methods.
One reason for the lower unemployment rates among women was not that they really fared better but that upon becoming unemployed they were more inclined to drop out of the labor force and to disappear from the statistics. In addition, Carol Heira [5] has pointed to the fact that many new firms in expanding sectors preferred to take on new workers like women and juveniles without prior experience in industry. These workers were desirable by virtue of the fact that they did not bring to employment A remarkable feature of this labor market was the amount of movement in and out of unemployment. Mark Thomas [6] has estimated that in the early '30s one out of every 15 unemployed persons found a job in a given week. Workers moved in and out of the pool of unemployed at two to three times the rates of the 1980s. This meant that the burden of unemployment was widely shared. In a year like 1932, when the unemployment rate was 22 8 per cent, not 22 but 53 per cent of workers experienced at least some unemployment.
Part of the explanation for the speed of turnover lies in the operation of the unemployment insurance system, which gave rise to arrangements like the 0X0 system described above. But, in addition, the interwar labor market differed from the present by the extent of low job attachment. It was more common than today for workers to change employers. The extreme case was that of "casual workers," who might queue up at a different factory gate each morning to be taken on for only a day or even a morning's work. It followed that workers without firm job attachments might move in and out of the pool of unemployed while moving between employers.
The average spell of unemployment was longer than the experience of 
